Exclusive!

Bertrand Russell Tells Why British Labor Voted to Renounce The Bomb

By Bertrand Russell

We cabled Lord Russell last week to ask whether he would be willing to write an article explaining for the U. S. public the significance and background of the British Labor Party's majority vote for unilateral nuclear disarmament, the culmination of a mass campaign in which the 88-year old philosopher played a leading role. We are honored to be able to publish his inspiring article in this week's issue.

The majority vote in favor of unilateralism at the British Labour Party's Scarborough Conference had come in the immediately preceding weeks to be expected by those who were in the know. It had been, however, something of a surprise even to the advocates of unilateralism to find that their propaganda was having a success surpassing all they had ever expected.

Various considerations contributed to this decision. I think

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What Do We Do In Cuba If We Win?

The German strategist, Clausewitz, in a famous chestnut, said war was the continuation of politics by other means. This implies that it has some rational purpose beyond vengeful or vindictive destruction. It is time we asked ourselves just what is the goal of our growing war on Cuba.

Let us suppose Fidel Castro were to surrender tomorrow and tell us, "Do what you will with my country." What would we do? If our aim is free elections, there is little doubt that these would be won by Castro. But few are naive enough, after the long cozy years of our partnership with Batista, to believe that we are imposing economic sanctions on Cuba and encouraging counter-revolutionary preparations in order to force free elections. The sugar companies and the oil companies and the cattle companies want their property back.

The Bourbons Couldn't Do It

And this is where we had better do a little thinking. It would not be difficult to restore certain kinds of U.S. property in Cuba. Indeed much of it had been "intervened" rather than "expropriated" to facilitate return in future negotiations with the U.S. The restoration of Sears, Roebuck or the luxury hotels or even the oil refineries is a comparatively simple problem, whether by a military victory or by negotiation. But to take the land away from the peasantry and give it back to the sugar companies is another matter. Even if Castro surrendered tomorrow, the land would still be in the hands of the peasants, and once peasants get the land they till, it is an almost impossible task to take it away from them. The Bourbon restoration was never able to do it in France. Even Stalin, ruthless as he was, had to wage a long struggle of almost civil war proportions to dispossess the peasants and collectivize the land in the Soviet Union. I cannot think of a single instance where land once distributed in an agrarian reform has been returned to its feudal or capitalist former owners.

Let us not confuse Cuba with Guatemala. In Guatemala, Arbenz was forced to resign by the army chiefs after we bought them over to our side. Land reform had hardly begun and the army was there to restore "order." But in Cuba Castro wisely liquidated both the Batista army and the Batista police. Since then he has given arms to the workers and the peasantry. What Castro has done for the Cuban peasantry can never be undone, and we will incur the hatred of all Latin America and risk world war if we try it.

A new regime backed by the U.S. would have trouble enough undoing other Castro reforms, raising rents again, increasing electric rates, turning schools back into barracks, and beating the labor unions into submission. It would face an impossible task in the countryside. The mere effort would require measures so repressive and brutal as to shame forever our pretensions to being a champion of freedom. The best we can do is to obtain compensation for the land and the restoration of those properties which can serve the Cuban people just as well under private ownership, particularly since the Cubans just don't have the trained cadres to run a totally socialized economy. But these sensible goals could best be reached by negotiation. To encourage counter revolutionary forces to tear Cuba apart by civil war first is to sow a harvest of bitterness which would make any reasonable solution unlikely. We wish those two running for President would stop and think a moment about this. One of them is going to have to deal with it. The problem is not being made easier by the lynch mob spirit both are whipping up against Cuba in low and unscrupulous competition.

Strange Advice From A Free Press

"Moreover, what Mr. Kennedy advocated looks toward doing in Cuba what the Administration, as all the world knows, did do in Guatemala. The only difference is that Mr. Kennedy very unwisely said what he would do about Cuba in the future, whereas the Eisenhower Administration has been boasting about what it did in the past in Guatemala. What this shows is that neither side seems to have learned the lesson, so flagrantly illustrated in the U-2 affair, that when a government goes into the political black market it must keep its mouth shut."

—Walter Lippmann, October 25.

"Senator Kennedy would have done better to keep quiet . . . for we are now probably in for another big splashy debate involving not only Cuba but Guatemala and the activities of the CIA, and a lot of other things that could well be left unsaid."

—James Reston, The New York Times, same day.

"Perhaps it is a mistake to talk about such matters publicly."

—Washington Post editorial, same day.

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Why British Opinion Sees Nuclear War More Rationally Than U.S. or Soviet...

(Continued from Page One)

the fundamental motive which lent urgency to all the others was pacifist sentiment. By this I do not mean pacifist convictions. I do not mean a fixed belief that all war is wrong. What I do mean is a vivid realization of the utter horror to be expected in a nuclear war. Young people would like to be allowed to grow up, and their parents sympathize with this wish. Those who have any hope of some human achievement in the future—political, intellectual, artistic, or what not—do like to think of our planet gone cold and no longer a supporter of life. Nor is it only that there would no longer be any creation of fresh beauty or fresh thought or fresh ability. It is also that all that man has created hitherto would be obliterated. The world contains music, paintings, sculpture, architecture, poetry, which make every reflective person value what the human race has achieved in spite of its many imperfections. All this, even if not destroyed or broken, will cease along with the instinctive joy of life when there are no human beings to see or hear or feel. I think that such sentiments inclined Britons to view favorably any proposal that seems likely to keep Briton out of war.

The Role of National Pride

But why, you may ask, do such thoughts not have a similar effect upon American and Russian opinion? At this point, national pride comes in. America and Russia contest the empire of the world, and each feels that a loss of prestige to its own side is a loss to itself. Britain, having become a satellite, cannot escape what is felt to be humiliation either by submission to America or by concessions to Russia. This makes Britain more ready than either Russia or America to view nuclear dangers rationally and not through a mist of military myths. We know that Russia could exterminate the whole population of Britain in an hour by the use of, at most, 2% of the Soviet stock of H-bombs. We have reason to think that this could be done without bringing on a war between Russia and America. The reasons for this belief have been set forth, for instance, by Mr. Herman Kahn in an article entitled "The Feasibility of War and Deterrence" originally published in the Stanford Research Institute *Journal* and reprinted with some alterations in Vol. 11, No. 2, of *Survival*.

These various considerations converge in suggesting that Britain as a non-nuclear neutral would be safer than as a member of NATO and, in addition to being safer, would cease to be an accomplice in the unimaginable wickedness of exterminating the human race. Moreover, Britain would not *merely* cease to be an accomplice. All negotiations since 1945 have shown that East and West, unaided, are incompetent to reach agreement. If such agreement as the world imperatively needs is to be arrived at, it will have to be through the assistance of neutrals. The neutrals can suggest impartial compromises on vexed questions which both sides could accept without loss of face. Britain, as a neutral, could have influence of a quite different order from that which is due to the power to threaten extermination, and very much greater than that which is derived from being one of the minor Powers of NATO or than that which she can wield while committed to the policies of one side. Britain can no longer enjoy the imperialistic pride with which Rudyard Kipling intoxicated us, but we could, if neutral, enjoy a saner kind of pride in leading nations out of a blood-thirsty madness which is almost incredible to those who are not obsessed with it. The decision to advocate unilateralism for Britain is made less difficult than it would otherwise be by the realization that Britain adds very little to the military strength of NATO and could leave the alliance without causing any appreciable change in the balance of power. Moreover, abandonment of NATO by Britain does not appear to its advocates a surrender to Russia

The Christian View

"Dr. Matthews said yesterday that anybody would wholeheartedly wish to ban the bomb and war itself, but the real question was how best to work towards this end. What did the Christian faith suggest?

"Christians were involved in this world and had a duty towards civilization. It was only too clear that the world of nations had not so far been radically transformed by the Christian gospel. It was still to a large extent a world in which power was decisive.

"To think that the Sermon on the Mount could be directed to international relations was misleading. It was not possible for a nation as such to turn the other cheek."

—London Daily Telegraph, Oct. 17, reporting sermon by Dr. W. R. Matthews, Dean of St. Paul's, preaching against unilateral disarmament.

Pious AEC Member Offers "Evidence" of Secret Russian Nuclear Testing

From time to time AEC Chairman McCone has dropped hints that the Russians were secretly conducting nuclear tests, though he has never offered any evidence to support these poisonous surmises. On Oct. 21, however, the New York Times ran a UPI dispatch from Chicago reporting that AEC Commissioner Dr. Robert E. Wilson, addressing something called the Second National Youth Conference on the Atom, said the AEC had evidence indicating the Russians might be conducting underground nuclear tests.

Our curiosity piqued, we obtained the full text from the AEC. The only evidence the speech offered of Russian secret testing was this passage: "There have been recent indications of some explosions in Russia which they have tried to explain as unusually large shots of conventional high explosives. No explanation has been offered, however, with regard to their claim last winter of having just developed an amazing new weapon. If that was a nuclear weapon, as seems probable, how could they know it was amazing unless they had tested it? Or if they are 'turning out missiles like sausages' as Mr. Khrushchov said at the United Nations, dare we assume that these are either of old or untested designs?" This is pretty thin stuff.

The speech was a plea for resuming testing. Dr. Wilson was "confident" that "very important" improvements in nuclear weapons could be obtained if underground testing were resumed, although admitting regretfully that "the improvement to be expected would probably not be of the magnitude of the thousandfold increase in destructive power achieved by the development of the original A-bomb, nor of the second thousandfold increase on top of this when the H-bomb followed." Dr. Wilson warned the youth conference we had to be careful because we were up against a potential enemy who had no "religious background." We hope the conference ended with a prayer for just one more thousandfold increase so we could really be sure to blow everybody to Kingdom Come.

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. . . Britain As A Neutral Out of NATO Can Exert Moral Leadership for Peace

or to anybody else. It appears rather as a determination by Britain to take on a very arduous duty, the duty of conciliation. Russia and America claim the right to exterminate, not only each other, but all neutrals. It is clearly both the interest and the duty of neutrals to resist this arrogant claim of joint power of life and death. Britain, if neutral, can lead this resistance and thereby save the world.

It is, of course, well understood by those who advocate unilateralism for Britain that nothing done by Britain alone can appreciably diminish the danger of world war. That danger can only be averted by agreements to which Russia and America are parties. But British unilateralists are persuaded that Britain can do more to further such agreements as a neutral, and perhaps as leader of a neutral bloc, than can be done by any satellite of either East or West.

They Prefer the End of Man

Opponents of unilateralism find the reasoned cause for this policy totally unintelligible and therefore tend to regard it as the work of fellow-travellers undertaken in the interests of Russia. They are so persuaded of their own rationality and of their opponents' irrationality that they fail completely to come to grips with the rational arguments for British neutrality. Those who advocate unilateralism, but are quite obviously not pro-Russian, are thought to be weak in the head, since it is apparently held that anyone capable of thinking, and not only of feeling, must prefer the end of Man to even the faintest risk of Russian victory. We unilateralists, on the contrary, consider that our opponents, so far from being governed by the head, are governed by, not the heart, but the spleen to a degree that makes them incapable of rational judgment.

Perhaps the chief importance of the Labour Party's vote at Scarborough is that it brings into the domain of practical politics what had been, until now, regarded as a fad of cranks and crack-pots. The trade-unionists who have brought about this change are hard-headed men with much experience both in administration and in negotiation. They are men filled with common sense and not at all the sort of people to be carried away by a wave of hysteria. They are not intellectuals. Their hair is not long, and few of them have beards. They are men who have come to understand the urgent necessity of avoiding war, and the present awful imminence of war, either accidental or intended.

It is, of course, true that emotion is what lends force to their movement. The emotion in question is a wish for the survival of our nation and our species. Never, until now, has this wish been considered base or cowardly. Never, until now, has a man who has fought for his country been thought morally inferior to one who was willing to see all his compatriots dead. And it is indubitably complete national extinction which faces Britons while present policies continue. Their own Government has informed them that, in the event of war, it would make no attempt to protect civilians. Protection would only be given to those in charge of launching sites in the hope of a blood-thirsty vengeance after all other inhabitants of Great Britain had perished. It is scarcely surprising that such a policy is unattractive to those who do not enjoy the sweets of power. What is astonishing is that there is a single person in the whole country to defend such an insane horror. Only persistent misrepresentation on the part of most of the organs of publicity can explain such apathy as exists. Every person awakened to the horror which our masters are deceitfully preparing for us, is one more unit added to a force which is rapidly becoming overwhelming by means of which we hope power may at last fall into the hands of men not totally destitute of sanity and humanity. It is this hope that inspires the unilateralists who carried the day at Scarborough. Before long, we believe, we can carry the day throughout our own country, and, in the end, throughout the world.

That Free New England Spirit

Burlington, Vt., Oct. 19—Random interviews with rank and file voters and off-the-record talks with leaders of both parties indicate that Rep. Wm. H. Meyer, the first Democrat to be elected to the Congress from Vermont in 106 years, is in trouble.

Two years ago Mr. Meyer campaigned on a personal platform that advocated immediate admission of Communist China to the UN and bans on nuclear testing and the draft.

A motel operator who always votes Republican said: "I wouldn't call him a radical, exactly, but he has been what you might call a free thinker and it's kind of embarrassing to have him down in Washington."

—New York Times, October 20.

Senator Mansfield Warns Us to Prepare for Rising Neutralism in Japan, Too

Senator Mike Mansfield (D. Mont.), in a report on Japan to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, notes that Japan (along with the U. S.-Canada, Western Europe and the Soviet bloc) is again one of the four great industrial complexes of the world, with a rate of growth higher than any other—16 to 17 percent in 1959. Real wages have increased steadily; per capita income is now about $300 a year, the highest in Asia. But with 100 million people in a land the size of Montana, Japan must export to live.

Economically, Japan must become less dependent on the U. S. In the 6 years 1953-58, she had a $2 billion adverse balance of payments with the U. S., and had to earn dollars in other markets to balance her accounts. Southeast Asia is still hostile to Japan because of war-time occupation. India, which used to buy Japanese piece goods, is now making her own. Japan looks again to the mainland markets of Korea and China. Here the need for greater economic independence from the U. S. and the cold war creates a need for greater political independence.

In this context Senator Mansfield warns us to expect a growing neutralism in Japan, and to "avoid attitudes of shock and panic reprisals" when Japan resumes trade and other relations with China and the Soviet maritime provinces. He cautions that our defense treaty is "a political liability within Japan and a source of irritation" and he thinks we could help Japan by considering the idea of unifying and neutralizing Korea on the Austrian model.

The Mansfield report contains a cryptic but pregnant observation. It says Japanese traditionalism faces a continuous decline due to urbanization "unless it is again diverted into a new militarism." Either we allow Japan peacefully to renew her trade with China on a neutralist basis, or ally ourselves with a militarism which can again be turned against us.

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Kennedy, Like Nixon, Had Trouble in Finding Himself The Right "Image"

Schlesinger's Effort to Deny Kennedy and Nixon Both "Cool Cats"

The purpose of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.'s, little campaign book, "Kennedy or Nixon: Does It Make Any Difference?" is to disprove the view that both candidates are a couple of "cool cats." The book devastates the easily devastated Mr. Nixon but it doesn't do too well with Senator Kennedy.

At one point we are reminded that Mr. Nixon once called Secretary Benson one of the best Secretaries of Agriculture in our history and later repudiated him. A few pages on we are told that Kennedy, too, was originally for Benson and then switched "either because J. K. Galbraith and other economists convinced him that Benson was wrong on the merits, or because it was politically disastrous to be for Benson."

Few Issues on Which to Be Inconsistent

Prof. Schlesinger claims Kennedy has otherwise had "a consistent record." The record, more closely examined, shows that Kennedy like Nixon has been identified with few issues on which to *be* inconsistent. Schlesinger criticizes Nixon for this but when he tries (at pages 20-22) to contrast Kennedy's record, it is revealing how few issues he can cite.

Kennedy was not associated with the struggle for the rights of colored men—except at a safe distance, in Algeria; Schlesinger calls him "an unusually active member" of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee but he was usually active elsewhere; Kennedy was conspicuous by his absence from the hearings of the disarmament subcommittee of which he was the most inactive member; the only issue with which he identified himself strongly was that of labor union reform.

Schlesinger says Nixon has no real "image," but implicitly admits Kennedy had trouble with his "image", too. He writes, *"Once Kennedy resolved the problem of his own identity,* his own emotions were liberated for an increasingly forceful commitment to liberalism." (Our italics.)

Even then this was not "informed by intuition and enriched by feeling" but was "cerebral." Isn't this a fancy way of saying that Kennedy doesn't feel deeply about liberal issues? And isn't it going a bit far to go on and say that Kennedy will be the most "cerebral" President since Wilson? There is no real comparison between the scholar Wilson and the Ivy League dilletante Kennedy.

Schlesinger is ludicrous at one point in his effort to build up his hero, when he contrasts Nixon's mawkish "Pat and I" exploitation of his family with Kennedy's attitude. "He has no scruples about using his family as part of his political organization," Schlesinger writes, "but he does not lug them into his serious speeches." It would be fatal to his chances if he did, particularly that father of his.

The weakest point in the book is its discussion of Kennedy's attitude on McCarthyism and civil liberties. Here Schlesinger admits that Kennedy lacks the "spontaneous visceral reactions" of the liberal but argues that Kennedy unlike Nixon "never has been obsessed with Communism as an internal threat." Why then, did he join Nixon in 1950 in voting to override Truman's veto of the Internal Security Act, the Mundt-Nixon bill, a vote Schlesinger does not mention?

Struggle to Save the Congo From Constitutional Rule

". . . U. S. diplomats . . . are 'very worried' over word from the capital at Leopoldville that the anti-Communist strongman, Col. Joseph Mobutu, is losing control of the Congolese government . . . Simultaneously, Mr. Lumumba's chances of returning to power appeared to improve. The UN command in the Congo was said by the press services to be pressing for "a return to legal democratic processes.' That presumably means the Congo's parliament should begin functioning again. If it does, many diplomats think it might vote the persuasive Mr. Lumumba back into power. . . . Whether Mr. Hammarskjold is buckling under Soviet demands or not, he does face conflicting pressure from the smaller African nations (which) . . . want some sort of constitutional rule rather than a military regime. . . . Although Secretary Herter's advisers insist they are keeping hands off Congo events . . . U. S. diplomats at the UN conferred several times last week with Mr. Hammarskjold on the subject. . . What's more, U. S. diplomats in Leopoldville have conferred often recently with Col. Mobutu when he has asked for advice."

—Wall Street Journal, Oct. 24, from Washington.

IFS Speaks 8 P.M. Nov. 4 Harvard Liberal Union Special Meeting on Cuba, 2 Divinity Place, Cambridge

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